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Eating us out of house and home: The dynamics of commodification and decommodification of 
reproductive labour in the formation of virtual work 
 
Ursula Huws, University of Hertfordshire 
 
Introduction 
It may be argued that the gender division of labour in the household is the most 
fundamental of all social divisions, playing its part in shaping all other divisions of labour 
whether these are hierarchical (who bosses whom around), technical (who uses what tools 
for which tasks), spatial (who does what work where), contractual (who is obliged to do 
what, how and for what reward) or cultural (the symbolic value of particular roles or tasks 
and the penalties for transgression). 
 
Decades of feminist scholarship have given us ample evidence of the connections between 
the household division of labour between men and women and patterns of segregation in 
the labour market. Inextricably entangled with these patterns are other, cross-cutting 
divisions between paid and unpaid labour, divisions which, furthermore, are unstable, 
subject to shifts related not just to changing social relations, economic circumstances and 
cultural norms but also to the ways in which technologies are deployed. But the importance 
of the shifting boundaries between paid and unpaid work does not stop there. The dynamic 
processes whereby reproductive work is commodified and decommodified also mean that it 
becomes the basis of new forms of work which, while contributing to the further 
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development of capitalist economies, remain deeply gendered, extending and perpetuating 
existing gender divisions, while also contributing to the development of new inequalities. 
 
This article begins by discussing some of these mutually reinforcing factors whereby the 
domestic division of labour shapes the public one. It then goes on to look at the dynamics of 
sectoral change resulting from commodification and decommodification. These include: the 
transformation of aspects of unpaid labour into paid labour, resulting in the development of 
new private and public service sectors; the development of new products that create the 
basis for new manufacturing industries that partially displace these service industries; the 
further development of new service industries relating to their production and distribution; 
and finally the emergence of new kinds of unpaid labour connected with the consumption 
of these new goods and services. It concludes by summarizing the complex interaction of 
social, economic and technological factors in shaping the new divisions of labour emerging 
from these rapidly changing developments, which, nonetheless, have gendered divisions at 
their origin. The article draws on a large body of past research by the author, which can be 
found summarized in two collections of essays, published in 2003 and 2014. If not otherwise 
referenced, these form the sources for all the material in the text that follows. 
 
How the gender division of labour in unpaid work shapes the gender division of labour in paid 
work 
 
The gender division of labour in the home shapes the gender division of labour outside the 
home in multiple ways. 
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One of these relates to the value placed on particular skills. The skills that women exercise 
unpaid in the home (e.g. cleaning, preparing food, care work) tend to have a low value on 
the labour market (because they have low scarcity). Thus women are not only more likely 
than men to be assigned these roles in the money economy, but these jobs are also likely to 
be paid less than those carried out by men. This has historically been associated with low 
levels of professionalization, organization and bargaining power for workers in these service 
occupations. 
 
A second factor relates to the more limited availability of women with household 
responsibilities, both in terms of the amount of time available and its disposition. The 
timetables of domestic work restrict availability on the labour market both temporally and 
spatially. In a process of mutual adaptation, in most developed economies, this has led to 
the creation of part-time, proximate jobs designed to meet the needs of women who are on 
this short leash from their homes. On the one hand, women seek out jobs that it is possible 
to combine logistically with their reproductive responsibilities. On the other, employers, 
seeing that this offers a cheap way to fill them, design jobs so that they meet these needs. 
In some cases, this mutually reinforcing process extends not just to the design of shift 
patterns that mesh with the daily rhythms of family life, but also longer-term temporal 
rhythms created by the institutional requirements that shape social reproduction, for 
example offering ‘term-time only’ contracts to parents of school-age children. Needless to 
say, such jobs tend to offer low rewards and poor prospects for advancement. This means 
that men are more likely to fill jobs that require extended working hours or long-distance 
travel, jobs which are more likely to be well rewarded. It should be noted, however, that 
there are exceptions to these patterns. At the bottom end of the labour market, women 
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workers may be forced to override the needs of their families in order to obtain an income. 
Examples of this are migrant women who have to leave their own children behind and travel 
to another continent to carry out low-paid reproductive work for others (Ehrenreich and 
Hoschchild 2004), and office cleaners who have to make contingent arrangements in order 
to work night shifts. At the other extreme, relatively privileged women can enter the labour 
market on similar terms to men by paying others to carry out their reproductive work. 
 
Other mutually reinforcing patterns have created expectations that career interruptions 
from childbirth and caring will lead to lower achievement by women, which in turn results in 
different normative models of educational and occupational choice for girl children. What is 
the point of expensively equipping a young woman with the skills for a high-flying job if she 
is going to give up work as soon as her first baby is on the way? 
 
These historical patterns have shaped a reality in which women have been less, or 
differently, qualified than men which, in turn, has led to them being steered into different, 
generally lower-paid, occupations. The resulting formation of a large pool of undereducated 
women workers has also led to male workers treating them as a threat who will undercut 
their hard-won wages and conditions.  
 
In sum, these patterns, in combination, have created a situation where there is a systematic 
segregation of women in the paid workforce along multiple dimensions including: 
occupation, sector, working hours, contractual status, pay and working conditions. These 
patterns are underpinned by deeply culturally embedded normative assumptions that, in an 
ideal world ‘a woman’s place is in the home’. And these norms, in turn, create sanctions 
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that serve to reinforce the boundaries between male and female spheres, both inside and 
outside the paid workforce. 
 
The long-standing, and deeply embedded, nature of these patterns does not, of course, 
mean that they have remained unchanged. On the contrary, new technologies and 
innovations in work organization have brought many twists and turns, with each new 
development creating both opportunities and threats, for women, but also for men. 
Automation, for example, simplified some labour processes, resulting in women being 
substituted for skilled and well-organized male workers in some industries, with the change 
typically accompanied by lower wages and different shift patterns. Standardization of 
procedures associated with digitization in bureaucratic organizations, such as banks, 
resulted in women being recruited as managers at precisely the moment these managerial 
jobs were being deskilled and transformed from jobs that required exercising professional 
judgement to those that were effectively team leaders (Crompton and Jones 1984; Game 
and Pringle 1983). The development of call centres created new kinds of part-time work, in 
different locations from the face-to-face customer service jobs that they replaced. The 
combination of information and communications technologies that made it possible for 
digitizable work to be carried out remotely was seen as an opportunity to allow people 
(most likely to be women with domestic responsibilities) to work from home, creating a new 
kind of two-tier segmentation in information processing work.  
 
Every twist in the division of labour has thus brought changes; but none of these changes 
seems yet to have posed a serious challenge to the underlying patterns of gender 
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segregation, even when introduced under a cloak of social innovation in a manner that is 
apparently progressive, emancipatory and unisex (Gill 2006). 
 
How unpaid work forms the basis for new industrial sectors 
 
Service sectors 
Historically, probably the oldest example of the transformation of unpaid work into paid 
work is rooted in social inequality. Households with greater resources hire poorer people to 
come and work for them, for example as domestic servants or agricultural workers, thereby 
consolidating their relative wealth and, in the process, reinforcing the economic differences 
that made such arrangements possible in the first place. In various pre-capitalist societies 
they were institutionally buttressed by a formalization of social difference (for instance in 
seigneurial, manorial or caste systems). Although not involving a wage relation, slavery is 
another institutional form by which the labour of one social group is appropriated for the 
benefit of another. There have been significant differences, from one country or historical 
period to another, in the ways in which specific tasks have been assigned to women, or 
men, in these servant-like relationships, but it is difficult to find examples in which there 
were none. In general, the pattern of occupational segregation among servants is 
remarkably similar to that in households in which the same tasks are carried out without 
payment or overtly coercive relations of dominance (Huws 2012). 
 
Ancient though it may be in its origins, this practice has by no means died out. Indeed, it 
shows every sign of having grown in the latter part of the twentieth and early twenty-first 
century, as economic pressures have pushed more and more women into the paid 
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workforce, creating a need for others to step in to take care of their reproductive work. 
Increasingly it is migrant women who make up this new cohort of low-paid domestic service 
workers whose labour enables other women to enter the formal labour market (Young 
2001). However since the advent of capitalism, such private service work, supplied within 
the context of a direct master (or mistress)–servant relationship has been supplanted, or 
supplemented, by other forms of delivery, involving intermediate bodies. 
 
In the twentieth century, partly as a result of campaigning by women’s organizations and 
social democratic groups, partly as a result of a political consensus that demanded certain 
minimum standards of public health and education, some of these roles were taken on by 
the state, resulting in the creation of public sector jobs for the provision of such services as 
childcare, nursing, care of the sick and elderly, education and the maintenance of public 
spaces and infrastructure.  
 
Since, at least, the nineteenth century, reproductive services have also been supplied by 
private companies such as laundries, suppliers of pre-cooked food and construction and 
maintenance contractors.  
 
In both public and private services, this has involved the creation of formally designated jobs 
in the public sphere in which workers have been absorbed into employment relationships, 
with state bodies or with firms, that are visible and regulated. In both spheres too, similar 
gendered patterns of occupational segregation to those that pertain in more private 
domestic work can be observed, with women more likely to be doing cleaning, cooking and 
care work and men more likely to be doing heavy manual work. 
 8 
 
In the twenty-first century, the changing relationship between these four domains - unpaid 
work, paid public sector work, paid private sector work and individualized paid service work 
– has become increasingly volatile, with a number of different trends simultaneously in play. 
 
One factor has been the impact of public policy. Public sector cuts have, on the one hand, 
driven much work that used to be carried out by paid public sector workers back into the 
home and community, where it reverts to unpaid and voluntary work. On the other hand, 
they have led to an outsourcing of public sector work to private companies in an attempt to 
reduce costs and increase efficiencies. This has led to a growth in service work, much of it 
contingent and low paid, carried out by private sector companies, involving workers are 
varied as cleaners and nurses, security guards, garbage disposal operatives and call centre 
workers. 
 
Meanwhile declining household incomes and the growth of single-earner households has 
led to increasing pressure on women to enter the labour market and work as many hours as 
possible. This in turn has created an additional need to purchase services they do not have 
the time to carry out for themselves, driving increased demand for individualized private 
services. In some cases, as already noted, these private services are carried out by 
individuals employed directly, sometimes informally, under arrangements whereby workers 
might carry out services such as cleaning, baby-sitting or dog-walking casually, for cash 
payments. There has, in other words, been a shuffling of activities between all four domains, 
with women’s work (by which I mean the kinds of work predominantly done by women) 
disproportionately likely to be implicated in each case. 
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The shifts do not stop here, however. An important trend, that has reached critical mass 
since the 2007–08 financial crisis, has been the development of online platforms for 
organizing service work. This has been particularly important in the transformation of work 
organization (and hence control patterns and payment systems) among individualized 
service workers providing services directly to consumers in their homes or in public spaces. 
A range of workers whose status previously most resembled that of domestic servants or 
self-employed workers in the informal economy, ranging from baby-sitters to window-
cleaners, from dog-walkers to gardeners, have been drawn within the orbit of international 
companies such as Taskrabbit, Helpling, Myhammer and Mybuilder. In the process, their 
work has been standardized and subjected to new kinds of market discipline, monitored 
online using standardized indicators (Huws 2017).  
 
When tasks are booked via these online platforms (as when they are done by other formally 
constituted private or public service providers), the relationship between the worker and 
the client is changed, with formal standards and control methods replacing those that have 
been informally – perhaps tacitly – negotiated.  
 
The development of online platforms is still at a relatively early stage but it seems likely that 
it will bring major transformations not only to the distribution of reproductive labour across 
the axes of paid/unpaid, public/private and individualized/corporate forms of organization 
but also to the quality of that work, both for the women and men who carry out this service 
work for money and for those who are recipients of these services (Huws 2016).  
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Manufacturing industries 
The shift of service labour from the domestic sphere to public or private service providers is 
not the only way in which reproductive labour is implicated in major sectoral change. 
Helped by technological change, another major historical trend is the substitution of goods 
for services. Thus the use of tailors is replaced by the purchase of ready-made clothes, 
laundries by washing machines, live music by mass-produced recordings and labour-
intensive food preparation by the purchase of ready-cooked meals.  
 
Each New Wave of technological development has been associated with a further 
development of this trend. For example in the early twentieth century the spread of 
electricity accompanied by an expansion in the development of domestic appliances such as 
refrigerators, vacuum cleaners and washing machines. Added to these, as the years went by, 
were other products such as hair dryers, toasters and microwave ovens. Developments in 
chemistry led to a wide array of cleaning products, from shampoo to toilet cleaner, as well 
as a range of plastics that made it possible to mass-produce extremely cheap and disposable 
versions of household products that had hitherto been available only to the better off. 
 
The jobs created to manufacture these products are very different in kind, and in location, 
from the service jobs they indirectly displace. They also change in character over time as 
developments in automation enable tasks requiring a high degree of craft skill to be 
replaced by simpler, more standardized processes that can be carried out by lower-paid 
workers. Outsourcing enables work to be exported to lower-wage countries, resulting in 
attenuated value chains spanning the globe. The gender division of labour varies along these 
production chains, but it is rare to find any process where there are not some jobs that are 
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marked as typically male, and others as female, with segmentation taking place along 
multiple dimensions. Women may, for example, be concentrated in different parts of the 
production process (e.g. assembly or packing), in different locations (e.g. working from 
home, or sitting at machines on the shop floor while men operate the fork-lift trucks in the 
warehouse), on different shifts or on different types of contract from men. Because each 
wave of automation impacts a different group of workers, it is likely that it will differentially 
affect men and women. 
 
Such production jobs may seem remote from the kinds of reproductive work carried out 
unpaid in the home. Yet their origins can be traced to the commodification of these 
household tasks and their progressive transformation from services to goods. 
 
Unpaid consumption work 
I turn finally to yet another tectonic shift in the dynamic displacement of reproductive 
labour. This time, in a kind of completion of the circle of production and consumption, the 
tasks carried out by paid workers are offloaded back onto consumers as unpaid labour.  
 
One way of looking at this is to see it as the last leg of the production process, in which the 
value that has been created along the chain by networks of workers who may not even be 
aware of each other’s existence is finally realized. The point at which the paid labour of the 
delivery worker and the unpaid labour of the consumer meet has always been fuzzy. Does 
the customer travel to market to collect the goods, or are they delivered to the home by a 
delivery worker? What is clear is that there is a strong historical trend for the companies 
that produce goods and services to transfer as much of this labour as possible onto the 
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customer in the interest of saving costs. Examples of this in the twentieth century, many of 
them aided by new technologies, include the introduction of self-service into supermarkets 
and canteens, the development of automatic cash machines and petrol pumps, passenger 
self-check-in at airports and flat-pack furniture for self-assembly. The development of the 
Internet vastly expanded the range of service activities that could be carried out by users: 
from booking holidays to filing tax returns. This has transformed labour processes, and 
greatly increased productivity, in former service industries such as banks, travel agents, 
retailing and public bureaucracies, but it has also added invisible extra hours to the 
consumer’s unpaid working day.  
 
The impact is not just a quantitative one – of adding additional minutes to the total time 
devoted to performing unpaid reproductive tasks. It is also qualitative, narrowing the scope 
for autonomy, for instance by requiring the tasks to be carried out during particular 
operating hours, and insisting that standard procedures are followed. The Taylorization and 
routinization of the labour processes of paid service workers are thus externalized and 
imposed onto unpaid workers, for example through the use of standardized scripts in call 
centres, and, online, requirements for pin numbers, passwords and the entry of data in 
particular, pre-specified formats. 
 
The promise that new appliances will be labour saving or that self-service will avoid time 
spent in queues turns out to have a sting in the tail. What consumer capitalism offers with 
one hand, it takes with the other, leaving those responsible for reproductive labour little 
escape from the time squeeze imposed by the need to combine paid and unpaid labour. For 
those who can afford it, the solution to this problem is to pay others to do the work. It is 
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now possible, via online platforms, to pay somebody else to assemble your flat-pack 
furniture, collect your kids from school or even wait in a queue for you. Thus do the wheels 
of commodification keep turning. And thus are gender inequalities reproduced, even while 
the labour of reproduction is transformed. 
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